Submission to:

Joint Select Committee Review of Government Procurement.

Using Government Procurement to Generate Local Jobs and Boost Economic Activity.

February 2017

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1. Introduction

BusVic is pleased to be able to make this Submission to the Federal Government's review of the Commonwealth procurement framework, specifically, the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPR). This Submission centres on factors associated with Government procurement and the draft Commonwealth Procurement Rules (March 2017.)

BusVic submits that:

- **Better government procurement decision making will eventuate if decision makers are in a position to identify and quantify the comprehensive costs and benefits pertaining to any procurement, including relevant externalities where appropriate.** [1]
- **The prime objective in government procurement should be to realise the highest net social benefit, not the lowest financial cost.**

Specifically, this Submission addresses:

- the necessity to quantify (or value) externalities and build triple bottom line impacts into the cost-benefit analysis process;
- the need for a nationally consistent definition of value-for-money ***within and amongst*** Australian jurisdictions;
- that government's be obliged to quantify critical link between government procurement and jobs;
- the need for negotiation as a method of procurement to become more universally adopted due to the shortcomings associated with some tendering regimes in the bus environment;
- the need for an improved approach to whole-of-government procurement.

In this Submission, we will recommend:

- Government procurement needs to include the consideration of all economic, social and environmental externalities where appropriate, and the CPR be updated to explicitly state this.
- Having one, nationally consistent definition of value-for-money across all jurisdictions and levels of Government agencies and departments, so that all government and industry stakeholders can have common goals.
- In respect of the new text added to Clause 10.30 in the CPR, we think the proposed text captures the spirit of what we are suggesting, but it needs to be more targeted than considering the economic benefit to the Australian economy as a whole. We suggest that the clause be modified in two fundamental ways, firstly, to include consideration of the social and environmental benefits a particular procurement, and secondly, that it not be restricted to viewing the benefit of the procurement through the prism of its benefit to the Australian wide economy, but rather its benefit to a State or Regional economy as well, or even, the industry in which the service/product is part of.
- The purpose for inserting Clause 10.30 needs to be considered: (a) whether or not it is necessary; and (b) the way it is currently written could require less consideration be given to relevant externalities and encourage more tendering.
- Government's should be obliged to, not discretionally, adopt a whole-of-government approach to procurement because value-for-money would be pursued through a more holistic, societal value-for-money lens, not exclusively a financially-oriented 'lowest price' lens.

[1] We acknowledge that this approach is not necessarily appropriate for *all* procurement projects. See pp. 5-6

2. Who is Bus Association Victoria Inc. (BusVic)?

BusVic (Bus Association Victoria, Inc.) is a member-owned, voluntary professional association for Victoria's private, accredited bus and coach operator's. Member operators offer bus and coach services across the route, mainstream school, special school, long-distance coach and charter and tour sectors throughout Victoria and other parts of Australia. Since 1944, BusVic has represented the best interests of members in a variety of ways, most importantly in respect of their relationship with Government and its Agencies, including contract negotiation and legislative and regulatory compliance.

BusVic invests in research and development on procurement, and social, economic, environmental, governance and safety factors on behalf of a 'community of interest', a collective of like-minded mainly family businesses that form the Victorian bus and coach industry. BusVic fosters, formulates, performs and evaluates society's policies that are in the furtherance of the public good. Inherent in this relationship is the concept of BusVic acting as an agent of public policy. BusVic facilitates collective action for government by using its networks, norms, interactions, trust and reciprocity of its members. BusVic also promote State Government policy initiatives and regulatory reform by holding training seminars and information sessions at conferences and events. This ensures bus operators and the bus service network remains evolutionary and up to date with best practice from other national and international public transport networks.

3. Externalities

The OECD (2002) defines externalities as situations when the effect of production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others that are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services. In other words, ***externalities are an uncompensated benefit or cost incurred by an incidental party as a result of an activity***. A voluntary exchange between two parties is considered mutually beneficial; however, the transaction can have additional positive or negative effects on third parties. It is these effects that are referred to as externalities.

In his PhD (Lowe, 2016) the author identified and valued an external benefit not currently considered in policy or planning for bus services: the value a bus operator contributes to their community, unrecompensed by government. This is a field where there has been no previous quantitative research.

The results reveal the potential community benefit foregone in the event of a government bus service margin reduction. The results show that if a state government reduced the value of the margin of a bus service contract by one third, a regional and rural Victorian community would be adversely affected by involuntarily accruing external costs in the form of reduced community interactions that exceed the value of the private saving to government associated with the reduced bus service contract price. Considerable sponsorship, financial and non-financial interactions, safety interactions, local expenditure, time contributions and donations would not occur, weakening the resilience of the affected community and in some cases, possibly contributing to the economic and social decline of the community.

Thus, the value of the community interactions foregone exceed the value of the private savings realised by government, diminishing the viability and prosperity of the community. This conundrum is presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Net Benefit/Cost Associated with 40 Victorian School Bus Operators Margin Reduction and Reduction in Community Interactions

Reduced community interactions as a result of bus service contract margin cuts and contract termination exercises are not in alignment with state and federal government's community and regional development objectives. For example, the homepage of Regional Development Victoria's (2015) website states:

> Our focus is on investment attraction, job creation, exports, creating stronger economies, communities and infrastructure to create a strong and growing regional and rural Victoria. There are a number of programs to promote business and industry development; work with local government and communities; help new businesses establish themselves; pave the way for existing industries to grow and diversify.

Community development is a broad term describing the practices of civic leaders and involved residents who are concerned with the building of stronger and more resilient local communities (Cavaye, 2014). Regional development is the general effort to reduce regional disparities by supporting regional economic activities that generate employment and wealth (OECD, 2014). Both deal with the economic and social improvement of infrastructure, improved community services, a greater and more diverse volume of production, lower unemployment, an increased number of jobs, rising average wealth and an improved quality of life (McCall, 2010), whereas a reduction in income associated with a margin cut or termination of service reduces an operator's ability to employ, reinvest income, sponsor and donate to community organisations, dedicate time to community causes and offer discounted services to individuals and organisations in the community.

If we assume that governments direct their agencies and departments to improve the productivity and/or efficiency of the bus network when procuring, at present they will only take into account the financial benefits to the responsible agency (or government department) arising from their reduction of costs for bus contracting services. The department or agency rarely consistently considers or calculates the ***external*** social, economic or environmental costs and/or benefits associated with the

transaction because they are not obliged to. The government department or agency procuring the bus service is only concerned with its own organisation's financial remit; to ensure that its actual expenditure does not exceed its budgeted expenditure.

Whereas, quantifying the wider economic, social and environmental costs and benefits (present, but not considered in this here) too, would achieve a socially optimum result. Ideally, this would see the department or agency responsible for administering the procurement be required to engage with other departments or agencies responsible for supporting, regulating or promoting the affected discipline, in this case, community and regional development, health, community services and education to understand what impact in terms of costs or benefits the measure would have on other these disciplines.

We appreciate the CPR already requires the consideration of broad range of factors when procuring, However there is no explicit reference to the need to consider the social, environmental and economic costs and benefits in the CPR, nor the revised draft rules.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Government procurement needs to include the consideration of all economic, social and environmental externalities where appropriate, and the CPR be updated to explicitly state this.

4. Value for Money

Having assessed some jurisdictions' procurement guidelines, there appear to be different understandings of what constitutes value-for-money both ***among and within*** Australian jurisdictions.

For instance, value-for-money is not formally defined in the *Commonwealth Procurement Rules* (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), but the document does discuss 'achieving' and 'considering' value-for-money, stating:

> …the price of the goods and services is not the sole determining factor in assessing value-for-money. A comparative analysis of the relevant financial and non-financial costs and benefits of alternative solutions throughout the procurement will inform a value-for-money assessment. (p. 13)

Despite this document explaining in detail how to achieve and consider value-for-money, there is no mention of externalities and the potential costs or benefits that accrue to third parties as part of the value-for-money procurement analysis process. ***Externalities could be implied, however, in 'indirect benefits and costs' and 'non-financial costs', but if this is the case, it needs to be more explicit and must include the obligation for the externalities to be identified and valued.***

In Victoria, VAGO (2007) defines value-for-money as:

> …the optimum combination of quality, quantity, risk, timeliness and cost on a whole-of-contract and whole-of-asset life basis. (p. 7)

Similarly, VGPB's (2015a) website defines value-for-money as:

> … a balanced judgement of financial and non-financial factors. Typical factors include fitness for purpose, quality, whole-of-life costs, risk, environmental and sustainability issues, and price.

At best, the aforementioned definition only infers the inclusion of externalities.

The New South Wales Government's (2015) ProcurePoint (one website for all its procurement information) defines value-for-money as:

> … the differential between the total benefit derived from a good or a service against its total cost, when assessed over the period the goods or services are to be utilised. Benefits, costs and risks include money and non-monetary factors. While most non-monetary factors can be translated into money equivalent amounts, others cannot be easily translated. These factors still remain relevant to the assessment of value-for-money.

'Environment impacts', 'non-monetary factors' and 'non-financial costs' imply some consideration of potential external costs in the decision-making process.

It is clear that value-for-money has different definitions and understandings both among and within Australian jurisdictions. Thus, it is likely that each Australian jurisdiction is evaluating value-for-money with different priorities and placing different weightings on the determinants associated with evaluation. While the New South Wales definition strongly implies it, there is no explicit reference to external costs or benefits that can accrue to third parties, *vis-à-vis* the eight interactions defined in this study in any of the definitions of value-for-money.

KEY POINT 1: The continued exclusion, or ignoring of externalities and a reluctance to identify and value externalities in value-for-money analysis methods will see external social benefits foregone as a result of a reduction in purchase price and *vice versa*.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Establish one, nationally consistent definition of value-for-money across all levels of Government agencies and departments, so all government and industry stakeholders can have common goals.

5. Procurement and Jobs

In late 2015, BusVic commissioned the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) to assess the economic benefits for the Victorian economy of local bus manufacturing[2]. This was done by comparing the economic benefits that are generated for Victoria for the typical annual state-funded route bus order (being 100 buses a year) from three different locations of bus manufacturing. The three locations are:

(i) offshore, that is, the importation of fully assembled buses;
(ii) Brisbane City in South East Queensland; and
(iii) Greater Dandenong in Melbourne.

It was found that total national employment for the Victorian production case would result in 154 additional employment position in 2017, 218 in 2018 and an additional 112 over 2019 and 2020 as a result of lagged adjustment effects. Total additional employment as a result of the domestic purchase in Victoria is 485 employment positions per 100 buses compared to the case of overseas purchases of buses. Of the total national increase in employment 427, or 88 per cent, will be in Victoria.

KEY POINT 2: Each bus purchased by a Victorian operator from Greater Dandenong keeps nearly five Victorians in automotive manufacturing jobs.

In terms of gross state/regional product, over four years the increase in national gross product is $61.7 million, of which 85 per cent, or $52.6 million in 2013 prices, is captured by the Victorian economy. Just under 50 per cent of the increase in gross regional product is captured by Greater Dandenong.

For buses ordered from South East Queensland, the total number of net additional employment positions falls to 27.5, or a net loss of 400, compared to the Victorian production case. In terms of gross regional product, the increase in Victorian GRP is $3.9 million, in 2013 prices, compared to the import case. However, this would also represent a decline in Victorian gross state product of $48.7 million compared to the Greater Dandenong production case. Lastly, for buses that are fully imported, all that happens to the economy is that imports over two years increases by $43 million, in 2013 prices and all purchases made from overseas only inflates the current account deficit. There is no contribution to employment.

KEY POINT 3: Obliging firms to procure their assets from manufacturers in the state in which they operate, and not overseas, would see the Government's realise substantial progress towards achieving their employment objectives.

RECOMMENDATION 3: In respect of the new text added to Clause 10.30 in the CPR, we think the proposed text captures the spirit of what we are suggesting, but it needs to be more targeted than considering the economic benefit to the Australian economy as a whole. We suggest that the clause be modified in two fundamental ways, firstly, to include consideration of the social and environmental benefits a particular procurement, and secondly, that it not be restricted to viewing the benefit of the procurement through the prism of its benefit to the Australian economy taken as a whole, but rather its benefit to a State or Regional economy as well, or even, the industry in which the service/product is part of.

[2] NIEIR's full report appears in *Addendum 1*

6. Free Trade Agreements, Methods of Procurement & Community Prosperity

Procurement encompasses the whole process of obtaining goods and services. It begins when a need has been identified and a decision has been made on the procurement requirement. Procurement continues through the process of business planning, risk assessment, seeking and evaluating alternative solutions, the awarding of a contract, the delivery of and payment for the goods and services and, where relevant, the ongoing management of the contract and consideration of disposal of goods.

Prevailing economic orthodoxy provides that the way to improve the economic welfare of a nation is for it to trade goods and services with other nations. The understanding is that with minimal levels of regulation, the market forces of supply and demand will ensure the resources of participating nations are directed to the areas of market activity in which they hold comparative advantage, leading to the most efficient use of resources and subsequent improvements in economic welfare. To give effect to this orthodoxy, there has been a plethora of free-trade agreements negotiated between nations. As a small open economy, Australia relies heavily on these agreements to open markets in other countries for its exporters. During recent decades, Australian governments have entered numerous free-trade agreements.

One of the most significant of these is the Australia e United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) which came into force on 1 January 2005. Chapter 15 of AUSFTA sets out the manner in which government procurement should proceed. It has had a major impact on how Australian Commonwealth Government departments and agencies procure goods and services, as well as on how the states and territories do so, including the State of Victoria. Soon after AUSTFA was executed, prescriptive policies for an extremely wide range of goods and services were developed by Australian governments to give effect to AUSFTA, including procurement value limits and appropriate methods of procurement relating to these limits.

From 1 January 2015 however, all departments and agencies of the State of Victoria have moved away from such a prescriptive approach. Among other changes, the new approach no longer has set value limits. According to the home page of the Victorian Government Procurement Board (VGPB) website, this change represents a shift for procurement 'from a financial threshold to a complexity and risk based model'. The Commonwealth has also recently revised its procurement law and principles, but its approach remains very prescriptive and reflective of the requirements of Chapter 15. For governments, the focus of free-trade agreements and related policies is for their departments and agencies to procure goods and services via competitive tendering. At the international level the rise of competitive tendering and privatisation has been based in the 'New Public Management' approach which seeks to introduce market-like disciplines into public sector decision-making. The claim is that this will improve service efficiency by reducing costs per unit of output, and effectiveness in responsiveness to consumer demands. Stanley et al. note that:

> *It is characterised by purchaser/provider splits, contracts defined by performance targets (with Key Performance Indicators [KPIs] embedded, directly influencing provider remuneration) and by politicians acting like corporate non-executive directors (e.g. removed from the decision-making process for delivery and contract management) (Stanley, Betts, & Lucas, 2005, p. 8).*

While this tendering purportedly has the purpose of ensuring value-for-money solutions for participating governments, in practice it is often simply procuring goods and services for the lowest possible price as determined by the cost to the relevant government department or agency, rather than the best possible benefit for the society as a whole. In particular, the 1990s saw a noticeable increase in competitive tendering of a range of services that had previously been supplied by

governments. This was mainly driven by pressures to reduce the budget cost impact of service provision (Hensher & Stanley, 2003a, p. 3). Procurement methods have been a primary focus of the Australian bus and coach industry since the late 1980s, mainly via the Thredbo International Conference Series, a biennial conference that began in 1989, which examines passenger transport competition and ownership issues, reporting on recent research and experience and developing conclusions on key issues. It focuses on determining the effects of different forms of competition, ownership and organisation for land-based passenger transport on operators, users, governments/funders and society as a whole (Kavanagh, 2016.)

Conceptually, competitive tendering involves the public sector deciding what services should be competitively tendered and scopes out what specification should apply to the service. The market then responds to the tender and the firm with the lowest priced responsible and responsive tender that demonstrates the ability to provide the required quality and quantity of service is usually awarded the business.

Most of the literature on the features and benefits of tendering was published in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when globalisation, privatisation and deregulation were gaining momentum. Communist and socialist countries were converting to market economies and many nations were facing sizeable financial challenges, thus contracting with the private sector at the lowest price gained momentum. In public transport, this saw the creation of several European firms contracted to operate ex-government assets. These firms are now large multinational enterprise operators that have a significant presence in many countries, including Australia.

However, since the 1990s, there has been a growing body of literature and examples where tendering has not delivered the expected outcomes, for contract, market and organisational reasons. A key expectation of government in the use of competitive tendering is that it will reduce its costs, encourage operator innovation and improve customer service. However, this has not always been the case, as evidenced by many international case studies (Veeneman, 2010; Hensher and Wallis, 2005; Arlbjorn & Vagn Freytag, 2011; Wallis et al., 2010; Hensher, 2008, 2014, Kavanagh, 2016.) The case for negotiation, however, suggests the aforementioned scenarios may have been avoided. Australian bus service contracts have been pioneers in the development of negotiated performance-based contracts, founded on a partnership, whereby contracts are re-negotiated with existing operators, subject to meeting certain conditions.

Between 2012 and 2015, the writer undertook at PhD at Monash University about how various bus operator governance models interact with and contribute to their communities. This included a Survey of 1623 operators around Australia. In that study, the author identified eight ways in which a firm interacts with its community. These interactions that were up until recently unidentified, were revealed to be: discounts (underpriced services); financial and non-financial donations; sponsorships; time contributions; safety contributions; purchasing behaviour; sharing of resources and combining of resources.

In his study, the writer also hypothesized that there were seven factors that influenced the extent of an operators' propensity to interact with their community. One of those seven factors was procurement. The other six were: firm size; operator type (route, school, charter/tour); operator location (regional or metropolitan); residence of operator (live in or out of the community in which they provide a transport service); sense of community; and linking social capital.

KEY POINT 4: The results of the study show that firms with negotiated contracts interact with their communities more than operators with tendered bus service contracts.

Figure 1 shows the mean value of the sum-of-six community interactions on a per-staff-member basis: operators with a negotiated bus service contract interact to the value of $2,558, whereas operators that do not have a negotiated bus service contract interact to the value of $1,970. The mean was $2,215.



Difference (Contract renewed via Negotiation)	Sig. value for Independent Samples t-Test (Linear data values)
[No] -[Yes]	.286

Figure 1: Aggregate Community Interactions Per-Staff-Member, Resolved by Form of Contract, and Corresponding Contrast Test Result

KEY POINT 5: We need to exercise extreme caution when attempting to make all Commonwealth Procurement decisions subject to international FTA's, as the additional text at Clause 10.30 does, because the means may not justify the ends. For example, the FTA's may require more tendering rather than less and for many 'socially' based industries like the bus industry, it has been proven that negotiated performance based contracts are a better tool to meet the social, economic and environmental goals of government. Negotiation is also a cheaper method of procurement, which assists in the reduction of Government transaction costs.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The purpose for inserting Clause 10.30 needs to be considered (a) whether or not it is necessary and (b) the way it is currently written could require less consideration be given to relevant externalities and more tendering.

7. Whole of Government

There is a need for whole-of-government value-for-money analysis methods and decision making when it comes to government procurement for major transactions. Stopher & Stanley (2014) suggest that this is very evident in government, where agencies often exist in 'silos' (in traditional functional administrative frameworks and encouraging behaviour that protects territory and self-interest) with little or no cross-communication, so that the range of options and alternatives that can be considered is restricted within each governmental agency, and solutions that would require multiple agency input are rarely identified. Such agencies tend to operate in an environment of 'This is the way we do this', reinforced by the publication of volumes of standard operating procedures.

Rather than one department or agency working as a 'silo' and only considering its own financial costs or benefits associated with the purchasing of bus services, if governments worked inter-dependently to identify and value external social costs or benefits associated with procurement, different decisions may be made concerning the awarding of contracts.

RECOMMENDATION 5: Better outcomes would eventuate if Government's were obliged to, not discretionally, adopt a whole-of-government approach to procurement because value-for-money would be pursued through a more holistic, societal value-for-money lens, not exclusively a financially-oriented 'lowest price' lens.

Some Victorian government departments execute whole-of-government approaches to procurement in, for example, internet services (Victorian Department of State Development and Business Innovation, 2015), reducing drug and alcohol abuse (Victorian Department of Health, 2015), addressing multicultural affairs (Victorian Multicultural Commission, 2015) and public sector leadership development (Victorian Public Sector Commission, 2015). These all involve one government department and/or agency including others in their remit. For instance, procuring internet services for not one but several government departments to achieve some scale economies, or coordinating the inclusion of employees from multiple government departments in professional development initiatives. Anecdotally, there are innumerable instances where the Victorian DET engages with PTV to give effect to the government's policies regarding the procurement of bus services for children to and from school, and informal consideration is sometimes given by DET to maintain a school bus service with a number of children that is below the threshold, often due to a political office bearer's intervention or community circumstances.

However, no evidence can be located that suggests government transport departments and agencies include the achievement of strategic objectives of non-transport departments and agencies in their procurement endeavours.

For instance, linking how the ordering of new buses to deliver bus service improvements has a positive effect on local employment, and how increasing the frequency and span of hours of operation of a bus service may encourage behavioural shift from private transport to public transport, contribute towards increased public transport patronage and how this could slow the rate of growth of urban congestion and reduce the road toll, thus reducing the burden on public health. These are some of the current opportunities available for the inter-linking of government objectives and better whole of government collaboration on strategic, societal policy objectives.

The prime objective in implementing whole of government value-for-money analysis methods should be to realise the highest net social benefit, not the lowest financial cost. Thus, improved governance associated with whole-of-government procurement is required.

8. Contracting for Social Values

Contracting for social values is a way governments might be able to achieve some of their social objectives and contribute towards achieving a net social benefit. Sometimes understood as 'sustainable procurement', social procurement serves to ensure that government purchasing decisions incorporate consideration of social value and, in so doing, ensure that government purchasing power maximises opportunities to achieve outcomes and benefits for the people and communities they serve.

The consideration of social values as a 'pillar' of procurement is one of the three pillars of the 'triple bottom-line' (economic, social, environmental) theory. *The Economist* (2009) states:

> …companies should be preparing three different (and quite separate) bottom-lines. One is the traditional measure of corporate profit—the 'bottom-line' of the profit and loss account. The second is the bottom-line of a company's 'people account'—a measure in some shape or form of how socially responsible an organisation has been throughout its operations. The third is the bottom-line of the company's 'planet' account—a measure of how environmentally responsible it has been. The triple bottom-line (TBL) thus consists of three Ps: profit, people and planet. It aims to measure the financial, social and environmental performance of the corporation over a period of time. Only a company that produces a TBL is taking account of the full cost involved in doing business.

Eversole and Martin (2005) acknowledge that triple bottom-line approaches generally posit that regional development has social and environmental, as well as economic components. While definitions of social value are broad, they refer to wider non-financial impacts of programmes, organisations and interventions, including the well-being of individuals and communities, the extent of social capital and the environment.

One way of ensuring that social values are considered part of whole-of-government value-for-money analysis methods is in legislation. Such a measure was introduced in the United Kingdom with the *Localism Act of 2011* and the *Public Services Social Value Act 2012*, which aim to create a new market-based competitive philosophy that prices in the social value discussed here. The Acts were based on the premise that if public money is spent, it should serve the public, not the private good. This philosophy argues for a new communitarian philosophy and presents an opportunity to create something akin to a 'Public Services Social Value Act' to empower local communities, giving municipal councils and neighbourhoods more decision-making authority. The Act obligates tiers of government to consider how the services they commission and procure might improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the local community and fosters a pro-local and pro-social civic service philosophy that might add value to current best-value legislation. If such a measure were implemented in Australia, we could be fostering the sustainability of the governance model that this Submission shows contributes to the economic viability and social prosperity that comes with local procurement and community interaction – the small, regional, school bus operator who lives in the community in which they provide a bus service.

If a societal net benefit is the goal, a legislative framework that facilitates all three disciplines of externalities – economic, social and environmental – is needed to remedy any current inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies and constraints, and maximise net benefit. Thus, as we have already recommended, government procurement needs to include the consideration of all economic, social and environmental externalities where appropriate, and the CPR be updated to explicitly state this.

Legislation enabling the contracting for social (and environmental) values is in place in Victoria. The Transport Integration Act (Victorian Government, 2010) discusses principles of 'integrated decision making', which is defined as 'seeking to achieve Government policy objectives through coordination between all levels of government and government agencies and with the private sector'. (The term 'integration' in the legislation is intended to be inter-changeable with 'whole-of-government'.) This legislation sets a framework for necessary inter-governmental collaboration. Section 16 of the Act states:

> the principle of triple bottom-line assessment means an assessment of all the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits taking into account externalities and value-for-money. (Victorian Government, 2010, p. 24)

Section 24 states:

> a transport body must [not may] have regard to the transport system objectives in exercising its powers and performing its function under any transport legislation. (Victorian Government, 2010, p. 27)

and Section 25(2) states transport bodies:

> must have regard to the decision making principles in making decisions under any transport legislation. (Victorian Government, 2010, p.28)

Despite these obligations on Victorian transport bodies, it would appear that at worst, such bodies disregard and, at best, inadequately give effect to their obligations to consider triple bottom-line factors. The legislation does not cause government to mandatorily consider externalities and triple bottom-line factors. It is discretionary. This is causing external benefit to be foregone.

Obliging governments to value external triple bottom line impacts would be multidisciplinary, often requiring them to secure inter-governmental competency in the quantification of external costs and benefits, and engage in not just a greater degree of inter-agency and inter-departmental collaboration, but also a greater level of inter-jurisdictional, community and industry co-operation in order to inform their decision-making.

If externalities remain overlooked as part of transport service procurement regimes, the nature and extent of the social capital, including the level of civic welfare prevalent in many communities, may change for the worse because governments would continue to treat the lowest price as the sole or heavily weighted key determinant for awarding contracts, eroding a firm's propensity to interact with its community and support community and regional prosperity.

9. Level Playing Field

A level playing field is vital to achieving sustainable outcomes and value-for-money.

We submit that the 'playing field' is not as 'level' as it could be. For instance, when assessing tender responses, the government should establish whether firms bidding for contracts participate in transfer pricing or not. Transfer pricing refers to the prices charged on intra-company transfers of goods and services and being able to move profit between tax jurisdictions with differential tax rates, minimising total corporate tax and maximising returns to shareholders.

BusVic's members are typically small to medium, local family businesses who typically do not participate in transfer pricing. Transfer pricing presents as a point of difference and possible competitive advantage for multinational enterprise firms when pursuing growth strategies. This concept is currently receiving much attention by the Australian media (Chenoweth, 2014; Walsh, 2013), and a Senate Inquiry into tax avoidance and aggressive minimisation by multinational enterprises registered and operating in Australia is currently underway.

Local firms might respond to a tender for a service contract with a 10 per cent margin. Approximately 30 per cent of any profit made by that local firm is typically remitted to the Federal Government in the form of corporate tax. However multinational enterprises might be able to respond to a tender with a 7 per cent margin or less, because they may not have a 30 per cent tax liability on the margin component. This absence of corporate tax revenue inhibits the federal government's ability to reinvest tax income into infrastructure and services that our society needs. Knowing this, should the government be awarding contracts to firms whose primary objective is to deliver a return to shareholders rather than a return to the community?

Similarly, 457 visa's present an opportunity for some bidders to respond to tenders with lower labour rates than other bidders. This raises two issues: the under-utilisation of potential local applicants for jobs; and the under-payment of the 457 visa holder. Knowing this, should the State Government be awarding contracts to firms who participate in the 457 visa programme?

Levelling the playing field in these two areas might just see more contract work to go to local providers and more reinvestment in the local economy.

10. Conclusion

Better government procurement decision making will eventuate if decision makers are in a position to identify and quantify the comprehensive costs and benefits pertaining to any procurement, including relevant externalities where appropriate.

As such, BusVic recommends:

- Government procurement needs to include the consideration of all economic, social and environmental externalities where appropriate, and the CPR be updated to explicitly state this.
- Having one, nationally consistent definition of value-for-money across all jurisdictions and levels of Government agencies and departments, so that all government and industry stakeholders can have common goals.
- In respect of the new text added to Clause 10.30 in the CPR, we think the proposed text captures the spirit of what we are suggesting, but it needs to be more targeted than considering the economic benefit to the Australian economy as a whole. We suggest that the clause be modified in two fundamental ways, firstly, to include consideration of the social and environmental benefits a particular procurement, and secondly, that it not be restricted to viewing the benefit of the procurement through the prism of its benefit to the Australian wide economy, but rather its benefit to a State or Regional economy as well, or even, the industry in which the service/product is part of.
- The purpose for inserting Clause 10.30 needs to be considered: (a) whether or not it is necessary; and (b) the way it is currently written could require less consideration be given to relevant externalities and encourage more tendering.
- Government's should be obliged to, not discretionally, adopt a whole-of-government approach to procurement because value-for-money would be pursued through a more holistic, societal value-for-money lens, not exclusively a financially-oriented 'lowest price' lens.

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The economic benefits of local bus manufacture

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While the National Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes the material is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

The economic benefits of local bus manufacture

1. Study objective

The objective of this study is to assess the economic benefits for the Victorian economy of local bus manufacturing. This is done by comparing the economic benefits that are generated for Victoria from three different locations of bus manufacturing. The three locations are: offshore, that is, the importation of fully assembled buses; Brisbane City in South East Queensland; and Greater Dandenong in Melbourne.

Brisbane City and Greater Dandenong are the location of large bus production facilities. Large buses are defined as being more than 12.5 metres long and more than 26 seats.

2. The bus manufacturing industry

By "large bus production in Australia" is meant the production of buses from fully imported engine blocks and chassis. Up until 2004 nearly all buses were manufactured in Australia. Since then the high Australian dollar has resulted in a sharp increase in imported buses. In 2012 the share of imported buses reached 30 per cent of the total market.[3] The high Australian dollar resulted in imported buses having a cost advantage over local production. However, it is considered that the recent falls in the Australian exchange rate would have restored cost parity between local and foreign production. The average cost of the buses considered in the study is approximately $0.43 million per unit, in 2013 prices.

3. The indicative bus contract

The indicative bus contract is one which extend over two years for 100 buses. The total value of the contract is $43 million, in 2013 prices. This quantification allows the model results to be used to assess the value of any contract given the contract's total number of buses.

4. The model runs

For this project there are three model runs.

The study was undertaken using NIEIR's quarterly econometric model of all Australian Local Government Areas (LGAs). The model is a fully integrated input-output inter-regional trade flow model. The model has 49 industries per LGA.

All model runs extend to the June quarter 2021.

The Base case

The Base case represents the case where the buses are imported. Thus, all that happens to the economy is that imports over two years increases by $43 million, in 2013 prices.

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[3] Bus Industry Confederation, "*Submission to the Productivity Commission's Review of the Automotive Manufacturing Industry in Australia*", November 2013.

The Disturbed case one: Production of buses at Greater Dandenong

Disturbed case one is where the production of the business takes place at Greater Dandenong Local Government Area (LGA). The direct impact on other transport industry gives output as a $21.5 million increase for the two years of the contract, or $5.4 million per quarter.

Disturbed case two: Production of buses at Brisbane City

Disturbed case two is the case where the buses are produced in Brisbane City and on completion exported to Victoria.

Both the Disturbed case one and Disturbed case two are expressed as differences from the Base case.

5. The technical status of results

The technical status of the results is Type II multiplier results given the structure of the model used. That is, multiplier results on the economy capturing: inter-industry flow-on effects; and income-household consumption flow-on effects.

However, Social Security offset effects are incorporated. That is, newly unemployed households receive Social Security benefits which reduce the income-consumption flow-on effects. This is why the aggregate multiplier in the table of 1.3 (or national GDP divided by the loss in motor vehicle production) is relatively low. The other reason why the multiplier is low is due to the current relatively high import content of domestic production.

Type II multiplier results imply that the following remain constant before and after plant closure:
investment; interest rates; and exchange rates.

Plausible variations in (i) would increase the negative results, while possible variations in (ii) and (iii) would mitigate the negative impact.

6. The results

The results are given in the attached tables. The years for the indicator control are 2017 and 2018. Although the contract ends at the end of 2018 there will be flow-on effects into 2019 and 2020. The flow-on, or residual, effects come from such factors as the lagged adjustment of household consumption expenditure to increases in real household income and the lagged adjustment of employment increases to output increases. The full impact on each of the table indicators is obtained by summing over the four years.

The tables document the impact by State as well as for the two LGAs where the expenditure is applied. Also the impact on the full list of Victorian LGAs is also given.

Thus, from Table 1.1, total national employment for the Victorian production case would result in 154 additional employment in 2017, 218 in 2018 and an additional 112 over 2019 and 2020 as a result of lagged adjustment effects. Total additional employment as a result of the domestic purchase in Victoria is 485 employment positions per 100 buses compared to the case of overseas purchases. Thus, each bus purchased from Greater Dandenong keeps nearly five Victorians in jobs.

Of the total national increase in employment 427, or 88 per cent, will be in Victoria. In terms of gross state/regional product, from Table 1.4, over the four years the increase in national gross product is 61.7 million, of which 85 per cent, or $52.6 million in 2013 prices, is captured by the Victorian economy. From Table 1.9, just under 50 per cent of the increase in gross regional product is captured by Greater Dandenong.

Table set 2 profiles the impacts on the national, State and regional economies from production in Brisbane City. From Table 2.1, the total number of net additional employment positions falls to 27.5, or a net loss of 400, compared to the Victorian production case.

In terms of gross regional product, given in Table 2.4, the increase in Victorian GRP is $3.9 million, in 2013 prices, compared to the import case. However, this would also represent a decline in Victorian gross state product of $48.7 million compared to the Greater Dandenong production case.

Note: Total industry employment represents employment located within the boundaries of LGAs, whereas total resident employment represents total employment of residents who reside in the LGA.

7. Adjustment for cost parity

The assumption of this study is that there is cost parity between domestic production and imports.

The question which arises from this is "what if cost parity does not prevail in the non-trivial case where the imported buses can be purchased at a lower price that what can be purchased from overseas?"

From the economic perspective, one way to adjust the results is to assume that the additional costs are paid for by cuts in government expenditure out of other portfolios. In general, the government expenditure would have higher impact on the economy, for the same $m spend the expenditure on bus production. This is because buses will have a higher import content. As a rule of thumb the expectation would be that the impact on the Victorian economy for a $m spend of general government expenditure would be at least 20 per cent higher in terms of GRP, employment etc. increase than expenditure on bus production.

Thus, suppose that the cost penalty was 10 per cent. This means that the buses would be purchased from overseas for $39 million. Thus, the government would be paying out $4 million in additional costs which would represent a cut in general government expenditure of the same amount.

However, applying the 20 per cent rule means that the impact on the economy will be a general expenditure reduction requirement of $4.8 million. Thus, for a 10 per cent cost disability, the table results should not be reduced by 10 per cent, that is multiplying all the results in the table by 0.9, but by multiplying by 0.88.

Similarly, for a 15 per cent cost penalty the results in the table should not be scaled by 0.85 but by 0.82, and so on.

A 5 per cent cost penalty threshold of around 5 per cent could be accepted before discounting the results in the table to represent the claw back of Victorian taxation revenue from the enhanced economic activity.

Table 1.1 Industry employment: Victorian production case – employment adjustment per 100 buses (number)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Industry employment	5.8	11.0	8.0	2.4
VIC	Industry employment	142.0	195.0	72.5	17.0
QLD	Industry employment	2.5	5.2	4.2	1.4
SA	Industry employment	2.5	4.2	2.6	0.7
WA	Industry employment	0.9	1.7	1.1	0.3
TAS	Industry employment	0.6	1.2	1.0	0.3
NT	Industry employment	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
ACT	Industry employment	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0
TOTAL	**Industry employment**	**154.5**	**218.8**	**89.7**	**22.4**

Table 1.2 Total hours of work: Victorian production case – per 100 buses ('000)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Total industry hours of work	10.9	19.7	14.0	4.2
VIC	Total industry hours of work	248.8	333.0	115.8	27.4
QLD	Total industry hours of work	4.5	9.0	7.3	2.2
SA	Total industry hours of work	4.2	7.2	4.4	1.1
WA	Total industry hours of work	1.8	3.0	1.6	0.5
TAS	Total industry hours of work	1.1	2.1	1.3	0.5
NT	Total industry hours of work	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.1
ACT	Total industry hours of work	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
TOTAL	**Total industry hours of work**	**271.9**	**374.9**	**144.9**	**36.1**

Table 1.3 Other transport industry: Victorian production case – per 100 buses (number)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Industry employment transport industry	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.0
VIC	Industry employment transport industry	66.4	66.9	0.5	0.1
QLD	Industry employment transport industry	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0
SA	Industry employment transport industry	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.0
WA	Industry employment transport industry	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
TAS	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NT	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Industry employment transport industry**	**67.9**	**68.7**	**0.6**	**0.2**

Table 1.4 Gross regional product: Victorian production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.8	1.8	1.3	0.4
VIC	GRP (headline) at market prices	16.5	24.0	9.9	2.2
QLD	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.2
SA	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1
WA	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.0
TAS	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0
NT	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
ACT	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**GRP (headline) at market prices**	**18.3**	**27.6**	**12.5**	**2.9**

Table 1.5 Exports: Victorian production case – per 100 buses					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	1.3	1.9	1.3	0.4
VIC	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	7.3	9.9	3.7	0.9
QLD	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.2
SA	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.1
WA	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1
TAS	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0
NT	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total exports (international plus inter-regional)**	**10.2**	**14.3**	**6.0**	**1.8**

Table 1.6 Other transport: Victorian production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Total output	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
VIC	Total output	23.0	23.0	0.3	0.2
QLD	Total output	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
SA	Total output	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0
WA	Total output	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
TAS	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NT	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total output**	**23.7**	**23.8**	**0.4**	**0.2**

Table 1.7 Total consumption expenditure: Victorian production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.1	0.4	0.6	0.2
VIC	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	3.9	12.1	11.9	2.9
QLD	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.2
SA	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
WA	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
TAS	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
NT	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total private consumption expenditure including international imports**	**4.0**	**13.0**	**13.4**	**3.6**

Table 1.8 Household disposable income: Victorian production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Household disposable income	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.2
VIC	Household disposable income	11.5	15.7	5.6	1.3
QLD	Household disposable income	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.0
SA	Household disposable income	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0
WA	Household disposable income	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
TAS	Household disposable income	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
NT	Household disposable income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Household disposable income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Household disposable income**	**12.8**	**17.4**	**6.8**	**1.5**

Table 1.9 Local Government Area impact: Victorian production case – per 100 buses					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
Greater Dandenong (C)					
Resident employment	Number	18.2	20.5	2.8	0.5
Industry employment	Number	98.8	103.9	5.7	0.9
Household disposable income	2011 $m	1.3	1.5	0.3	0.0
GRP (headline at factor cost)	2011 $m	10.1	10.6	0.6	0.1
Total hours of work usual residence		30.2	33.7	4.5	0.9
Total industry hours of work		174.5	182.6	9.8	1.5
Brisbane (C)					
Resident employment	Number	0.8	1.7	1.4	0.5
Industry employment	Number	1.1	2.3	1.7	0.6
Household disposable income	2011 $m	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
GRP (headline at factor cost)	2011 $m	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
Total hours of work usual residence		1.5	2.9	2.3	0.7
Total industry hours of work		1.9	3.8	3.0	0.9

Table 1.10 Victorian Bus Production employment by location (JTW) by LGA – number				
LGA	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
Banyule (C)	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.3
Bass Coast (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Baw Baw (S)	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1
Bayside (C)	0.5	1.2	1.0	0.3
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	1.4	2.6	1.7	0.5
Brimbank (C)	0.6	1.2	0.9	0.3
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Cardinia (S)	0.6	2.0	1.9	0.4
Casey (C)	4.1	13.2	11.4	2.1
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.3
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Frankston (C)	1.7	5.1	4.4	0.9
Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	0.5	1.3	1.1	0.3
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Greater Dandenong (C)	98.8	103.9	5.7	0.9
Greater Geelong (C)	0.7	1.2	0.9	0.3
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.9	1.3	0.6	0.2
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	1.6	2.4	1.3	0.4
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	2.2	4.5	3.1	0.7

Knox (C)	1.5	3.7	3.0	0.7
Latrobe (C)	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Manningham (C)	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.3
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.2
Maroondah (C)	0.7	1.5	1.2	0.3
Melbourne (C)	11.2	18.0	9.2	2.1
Melton (S)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Moira (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Monash (C)	2.7	5.4	3.8	0.9
Moonee Valley (C)	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.2
Moorabool (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Moreland (C)	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.2
Mornington Peninsula (S)	0.7	2.2	2.2	0.6
Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	2.5	3.9	1.8	0.4
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	1.2	2.3	1.6	0.4
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	1.1	2.5	2.1	0.5
Whittlesea (C)	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.2
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Wyndham (C)	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.2
Yarra (C)	1.8	3.1	1.8	0.5
Yarra Ranges (S)	0.5	1.5	1.5	0.4
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Total	**154.5**	**218.8**	**89.7**	**22.4**

Table 1.11 Victorian Bus Production employment by location of resident by LGA – number				
LGA	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1
Banyule (C)	1.1	1.9	1.2	0.3
Bass Coast (S)	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1
Baw Baw (S)	0.7	1.1	0.6	0.2
Bayside (C)	1.9	2.9	1.4	0.3
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	2.5	4.0	2.1	0.5
Brimbank (C)	1.6	2.6	1.5	0.4
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Cardinia (S)	6.3	8.6	2.9	0.6
Casey (C)	35.0	43.2	10.4	2.0
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	1.2	2.1	1.3	0.4
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Frankston (C)	10.4	13.6	4.2	0.8
Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	2.9	4.3	2.0	0.5
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Greater Dandenong (C)	18.2	20.5	2.8	0.5
Greater Geelong (C)	1.0	1.7	1.1	0.3
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.2
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	1.3	2.1	1.3	0.3
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	7.4	9.5	2.8	0.6
Knox (C)	5.9	8.3	3.2	0.7
Latrobe (C)	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
Manningham (C)	1.7	2.7	1.5	0.4
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.8	1.3	0.7	0.2
Maroondah (C)	2.2	3.3	1.6	0.4
Melbourne (C)	1.7	2.6	1.3	0.3
Melton (S)	0.9	1.5	1.0	0.3
Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Moira (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Monash (C)	5.9	8.0	2.9	0.6
Moonee Valley (C)	1.0	1.8	1.1	0.3
Moorabool (S)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Moreland (C)	1.5	2.5	1.4	0.4
Mornington Peninsula (S)	4.5	6.9	3.3	0.8
Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0

Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.2
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	2.0	3.1	1.5	0.4
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	2.2	3.2	1.4	0.3
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	3.1	4.6	2.1	0.5
Whittlesea (C)	1.3	2.3	1.4	0.4
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Wyndham (C)	1.5	2.5	1.5	0.4
Yarra (C)	1.3	2.1	1.0	0.3
Yarra Ranges (S)	3.0	4.8	2.5	0.6
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 1.12 Victorian Bus Production gross regional product – 2011 $m at quarterly rates				
LGA	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Banyule (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Bass Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Baw Baw (S)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Bayside (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.0
Brimbank (C)	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cardinia (S)	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0
Casey (C)	0.6	1.6	1.3	0.2
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Frankston (C)	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.1
Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Greater Dandenong (C)	10.6	11.4	0.8	0.1
Greater Geelong (C)	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.1
Knox (C)	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.1
Latrobe (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Manningham (C)	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Maroondah (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Melbourne (C)	1.7	3.0	1.8	0.5
Melton (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moira (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Monash (C)	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.1
Moonee Valley (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Moorabool (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moreland (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mornington Peninsula (S)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1

Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.1
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Whittlesea (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wyndham (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Yarra (C)	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.0
Yarra Ranges (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	**16.5**	**24.0**	**9.9**	**2.2**

Table 2.1 Industry employment: Queensland production case – employment adjustment per 100 buses (number)

		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
NSW	Industry employment	5.9	14.1	13.3	4.4
VIC	Industry employment	4.1	8.8	7.8	2.7
QLD	Industry employment	121.7	181.1	79.2	17.4
SA	Industry employment	1.3	2.6	2.2	0.7
WA	Industry employment	0.6	1.3	1.1	0.3
TAS	Industry employment	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.3
NT	Industry employment	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
ACT	Industry employment	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
TOTAL	**Industry employment**	**134.0**	**209.0**	**104.5**	**25.9**

Table 2.2 Total hours of work: Queensland production case – per 100 buses ('000)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Total industry hours of work	10.8	25.0	22.9	7.5
VIC	Total industry hours of work	7.5	15.4	13.3	4.7
QLD	Total industry hours of work	219.4	312.1	124.6	27.1
SA	Total industry hours of work	2.2	4.7	3.7	1.1
WA	Total industry hours of work	1.3	2.4	1.5	0.6
TAS	Total industry hours of work	0.4	1.2	0.9	0.4
NT	Total industry hours of work	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1
ACT	Total industry hours of work	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1
TOTAL	**Total industry hours of work**	**241.9**	**361.5**	**167.5**	**41.5**

Table 2.3 Other transport industry: Queensland production case – per 100 buses (number)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	Industry employment transport industry	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.0
VIC	Industry employment transport industry	0.8	0.9	0.2	0.1
QLD	Industry employment transport industry	55.2	55.9	0.5	0.1
SA	Industry employment transport industry	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.0
WA	Industry employment transport industry	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
TAS	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NT	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Industry employment transport industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Industry employment transport industry**	**56.6**	**57.6**	**1.0**	**0.3**

Table 2.4 Gross regional product: Queensland production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
NSW	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.9	2.3	2.1	0.7
VIC	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.5	1.1	1.1	0.2
QLD	GRP (headline) at market prices	15.4	23.5	10.8	2.2
SA	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.1
WA	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0
TAS	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
NT	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
ACT	GRP (headline) at market prices	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
TOTAL	**GRP (headline) at market prices**	**17.3**	**27.7**	**14.7**	**3.3**

Table 2.5 Exports: Queensland production case – per 100 buses					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
NSW	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	1.3	2.4	2.0	0.7
VIC	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.8	1.5	1.0	0.3
QLD	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	19.4	20.8	1.8	0.5
SA	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
WA	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
TAS	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
NT	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total exports (international plus inter-regional)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total exports (international plus inter-regional)**	**22.1**	**25.9**	**5.4**	**1.9**

Table 2.6 Other transport production: Queensland production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
NSW	Total output	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
VIC	Total output	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
QLD	Total output	19.4	19.6	0.1	0.1
SA	Total output	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
WA	Total output	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
TAS	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NT	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total output	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total output**	**19.9**	**20.2**	**0.5**	**0.2**

Table 2.7 Total consumption expenditure: Queensland production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
NSW	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.1	0.4	1.1	0.5
VIC	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.1	0.6	0.8	0.3
QLD	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	4.5	14.5	13.7	3.1
SA	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
WA	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
TAS	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
NT	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Total private consumption expenditure including international imports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Total private consumption expenditure including international imports**	**4.7**	**15.6**	**15.9**	**4.0**

Table 2.8 Household disposable income: Queensland production case – per 100 buses (2011 $m)					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
NSW	Household disposable income	0.7	1.3	1.2	0.3
VIC	Household disposable income	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.2
QLD	Household disposable income	15.2	20.2	6.7	1.5
SA	Household disposable income	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
WA	Household disposable income	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
TAS	Household disposable income	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
NT	Household disposable income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ACT	Household disposable income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	**Household disposable income**	**16.7**	**22.6**	**8.9**	**2.1**

Table 2.9 LGA impact: Queensland production case – per 100 buses					
		2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
Greater Dandenong (C)					
Resident employment	Number	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Industry employment	Number	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
Household disposable income	2011 $m	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GRP (headline at factor cost)	2011 $m	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total hours of work usual residence		0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Total industry hours of work		0.6	0.9	0.5	0.2
Brisbane (C)					
Resident employment	Number	26.2	26.4	0.2	0.0
Industry employment	Number	108.3	140.6	41.7	8.6
Household disposable income	2011 $m	8.2	10.9	3.4	0.7
GRP (headline at factor cost)	2011 $m	12.8	16.5	5.0	1.0
Total hours of work usual residence		118.3	160.6	55.4	11.4
Total industry hours of work		198.4	250.1	67.5	13.8

Table 2.10 Queensland Bus Production employment by location (JTW) by LGA – number				
LGA	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Banyule (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Bass Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Baw Baw (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bayside (C)	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
Brimbank (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cardinia (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Casey (C)	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Frankston (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0

Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Dandenong (C)	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
Greater Geelong (C)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.1
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
Knox (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Latrobe (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Manningham (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Maroondah (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Melbourne (C)	0.9	2.0	1.7	0.6
Melton (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moira (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Monash (C)	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Moonee Valley (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Moorabool (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moreland (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mornington Peninsula (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Whittlesea (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wyndham (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1

Yarra (C)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Yarra Ranges (S)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	**4.1**	**8.8**	**7.8**	**2.7**

Table 2.11 Queensland Bus Production employment by location of resident by LGA – number

LGA	2017	2018	2019	2020 plus
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Banyule (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Bass Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Baw Baw (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bayside (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Brimbank (C)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cardinia (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Casey (C)	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.1
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Frankston (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Greater Dandenong (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Greater Geelong (C)	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
Knox (C)	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
Latrobe (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Manningham (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Maroondah (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Melbourne (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Melton (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1

Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Moira (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Monash (C)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1
Moonee Valley (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Moorabool (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moreland (C)	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
Mornington Peninsula (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Whittlesea (C)	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wyndham (C)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1
Yarra (C)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Yarra Ranges (S)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 2.12 Queensland Bus Production gross regional product – 2011 $m at quarterly rates				
LGA	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020 plus**
Alpine (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ararat (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ballarat (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Banyule (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bass Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Baw Baw (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bayside (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Benalla (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Boroondara (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brimbank (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Buloke (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Campaspe (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cardinia (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Casey (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Central Goldfields (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Colac-Otway (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Corangamite (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Darebin (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
East Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Frankston (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gannawarra (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glen Eira (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Glenelg (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Golden Plains (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Bendigo (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Dandenong (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greater Geelong (C)	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Greater Shepparton (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hepburn (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hindmarsh (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hobsons Bay (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Horsham (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hume (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Indigo (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kingston (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Knox (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Latrobe (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Loddon (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macedon Ranges (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Manningham (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mansfield (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maribyrnong (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maroondah (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Melbourne (C)	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.1
Melton (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mildura (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mitchell (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moira (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Monash (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moonee Valley (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moorabool (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moreland (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mornington Peninsula (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Mount Alexander (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moyne (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Murrindindi (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nillumbik (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Northern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Port Phillip (C)	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Pyrenees (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Queenscliffe (B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Gippsland (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Southern Grampians (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stonnington (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Strathbogie (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Surf Coast (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Swan Hill (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Towong (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wangaratta (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Warrnambool (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wellington (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
West Wimmera (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whitehorse (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Whittlesea (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wodonga (RC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wyndham (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yarra (C)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yarra Ranges (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yarriambiack (S)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unincorporated Vic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	**0.5**	**1.1**	**1.1**	**0.2**